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What would it be like if we said one thing, and heard ourselves saying something else?
Would we notice something was wrong? Or would we believe we said the thing we
heard? Is feedback of our own speech only used to detect errors, or does it also help to
specify the meaning of what we say? Comparator models of self-monitoring favor the
first alternative, and hold that our sense of agency is given by the comparison between
intentions and outcomes, while inferential models argue that agency is a more fluent
construct, dependent on contextual inferences about the most likely cause of an action. In
this paper, we present a theory about the use of feedback during speech. Specifically, we
discuss inferential models of speech production that question the standard comparator
assumption that the meaning of our utterances is fully specified before articulation.
We then argue that auditory feedback provides speakers with a channel for high-level,
semantic “self-comprehension”. In support of this we discuss results using a method we
recently developed called Real-time Speech Exchange (RSE). In our first study using RSE
(Lind et al., in press) participants were fitted with headsets and performed a computerized
Stroop task. We surreptitiously recorded words they said, and later in the test we played
them back at the exact same time that the participants uttered something else, while
blocking the actual feedback of their voice. Thus, participants said one thing, but heard
themselves saying something else. The results showed that when timing conditions were
ideal, more than two thirds of the manipulations went undetected. Crucially, in a large
proportion of the non-detected manipulated trials, the inserted words were experienced
as self-produced by the participants. This indicates that our sense of agency for speech
has a strong inferential component, and that auditory feedback of our own voice acts as
a pathway for semantic monitoring. We believe RSE holds great promise as a tool for
investigating the role of auditory feedback during speech, and we suggest a number of
future studies to serve this purpose.
Keywords: speech production, self-monitoring, feedback manipulation, auditory feedback, real-time speech
exchange, self-comprehension, agency
INTRODUCTION
In the study of action and agency there has been a vigorous debate
between comparator and inferential models (Daprati et al., 2003;
Haggard and Clark, 2003; Synofzik et al., 2008; Kühn et al., 2013).
According to the comparator perspective, comparisons between
intentions and outcomes (and comparisons between intentions
and the predictive simulations of outcomes) is what anchors
our fundamental sense of self as agents, and allow us to source
monitor between actions that are generated by ourselves, or done
by others (Gallagher, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2002; David, 2012;
Kühn et al., 2013). Furthermore, a comparator architecture is
what is supposed to underlie error correction by giving us the
ability to discriminate deliberate from accidental outcomes (Frith,
2014), and what we have done from what we plan to do (Sugimori
et al., 2013). On the other hand, inferential theories have noted
that there are a variety of abnormalities of authorship processing,
occurring in both natural and experimental conditions (such as
alien hand syndrome, schizophrenia, hypnosis, etc.), that suggest
our sense of agency is a much more fluent and fragile construct
that is dependent on inferences about which agent was the most
probable cause of the action, and what purpose or meaning the
action had (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Moore et al., 2009). As
Wegner and Sparrow (2004) puts it:
These examples suggest that authorship knowledge is not a
“given” when people produce apparently voluntary actions, and
instead that resolving the question of authorship for any action
may require considerable information and inference. Author-
ship processing is a form of causal inference in which events
are attributed to entities that are perceived to cause them
(p. 1202).
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It is natural to assume that this interesting clash of perspectives
would be mirrored closely in the study of speech production
and verbal self-monitoring, but surprisingly there has been very
little experimentation and discussion regarding the potential role
of auditory feedback in determining what we say and mean
(Dennett, 1991). This unfortunate lack of investigation stems
from the fact that all dominant theories of speech production are
part of the comparator family of models, and share the assump-
tion that speech starts with a clear preverbal conception of what to
say, which is then translated into an utterance through successive
levels of linguistic and articulatory encoding. However, in a recent
study (Lind et al., in press), we found evidence to suggest that our
sense of agency for speech has a strong inferential component,
and that auditory feedback of our own voice acts as a pathway for
semantic monitoring, potentially overriding other feedback loops.
In this paper we present an inferential theory about the use of
auditory feedback in which we believe the results of Lind et al.
(in press) become comprehensible, rather than unintuitive, as
present theories of speech production and self-monitoring would
suggest. Specifically, we propose a model of speech production
that questions the standard assumption that speech is always
guided by speech plans which are so detailed that the meaning
of speakers’ utterances are fully specified before articulation.
We then argue that auditory feedback is a prime channel for
monitoring high-level semantics, allowing speakers to perform a
form of continuous “self-comprehension” of their speech. Finally,
we present suggestions for future work using the method we have
developed.
THE STANDARD TRANSLATION MODEL OF SPEECH
If one considers speech to be principally a top-down affair where a
speech plan is first specified in detail and then translated through
temporally and locally separated stages into an actual utterance,
then it is very close at hand to assume that speech feedback play
only a supervisory role. The speaker knows what is to be said and
via feedback she makes sure that the machinery does not “glitch”
at any of the translation stages.
Underlying this view of self-monitoring as comparison of
output with plan we find what has been called the transla-
tion view of speech production (by e.g., Fowler, 1980; Fowler
et al., 1980; Linell, 1982). This is the standard type of speech
production model. The basic idea is that speech is governed
by a plan constituted by high level abstract invariant elements
which then needs to be translated into physical articulation (e.g.,
Fodor et al., 1974; Shattuck-Hufnagel, 1979; Dell, 1986; Levelt,
1989; Dell et al., 1993; Levelt et al., 1999). Consequently, the
task of psycholinguistic models of speech production has for a
long time been seen as the task of accounting for the successive
steps in this translation process. The basic framework in modern
theories can be traced back to Lashley (1951), whose idea of
planned behavior represented an alternative to the prevailing
behavioristic framework. His general idea was that there are
underlying plans for action sequences and he appealed to typing
and speech errors as evidence of the existence of such plans.
Errors are thought to reveal how a plan must exist, which is
then for some reason not correctly carried out. For example, in
an anticipation error, a segment which is to be spoken later in
a sequence mistakenly substitutes for a segment earlier in the
sequence, such as in “John dropped his cuff of coffee” (taken from
Fromkin, 1971). Indeed, the analysis of speech errors was for a
long time the main empirical tool for constructing models of the
translation processes believed to go on in-between the message
to be transmitted, and the actual (motoric) articulation of the
utterance (e.g., Fry, 1969; Fromkin, 1971; Garrett, 1975, 1976,
1980). The types of errors that speakers make, including the types
of segments which are believed to be open to exchange, deletion,
or addition have been used to construct arguments about the
specific workings of the translation processes. For example, an
error at the level of the phoneme motivates the postulation of
a specific level of processing that deals with the allocation of
phonemes.
This enthusiasm over error analysis has contributed to post-
poning the study of higher levels of speech planning. While
translation models differ in details, an important commonality
is that there is virtually no speculation about how the content of
a message to be conveyed is formulated. Rather, it is just assumed
that it is specified, and that it can provide the necessary impetus
for the rest of the production apparatus. Similarly, the specifics
of articulation are also seen as peripheral to the modeling. Levelt
et al. (1999) admit this themselves: “Our theory of lexical access is
not well developed for this initial stage of conceptual preparation”
(p. 8). Avoiding this question of, as Dell (1986) puts it, why
a speaker says what is said, and focusing instead on how it is
said, can be seen as a pragmatic strategy, allowing the researcher
to focus on aspects of production where it is easier to acquire
empirical evidence. However, as we see it, the very structure of this
type of model has made it too convenient for researchers to simply
disregard the supposed abstract high level by assuming that too
little is known about it, and that we will do better to focus on the
more tangible translation process. So while Levelt (1989) admits
that the conceptualizer is a simplification that needs to be further
explored, he also makes clear that “the mother of each speech act
is a communicative intention” (1989, p. 108), and simply asserts
that “where intentions come from is not a concern of this book”
(ibid., p. 59). Similarly, in his comprehensive summary of speech
production models, Postma (2000) simply takes as his starting
point that specific preverbal messages needs to be formulated:
“Speaking starts with conceptualization (planning an utterance’s
meaning and purpose). The conceptualizer delivers a proposi-
tional, preverbal message to the formulator. The formulator trans-
lates the preverbal message into a linguistic structure” (p. 99). The
result of these assumptions has been that the division between
abstract and physical aspects of speech has been solidified, and
the delegation of the process of conceptualization to a dedicated
black box “conceptualizer” has not really been questioned.
This general structure is explicitly or implicitly accepted by
most models of speech production. When Hickok (2012, 2014)
calls for the integration of traditional psycholinguistics and
more motor oriented theories of speech, he argues that both
fields are dominated by the same family of models. In partic-
ular, a commitment to a comparator architecture is evident in
the currently extremely popular notion of forward models in
speech (e.g., see Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2005, 2006; Guenther
et al., 2006; Christoffels et al., 2007; Behroozmand et al., 2011;
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 166 | 2
Lind et al. The “self-comprehension” hypothesis
Chang et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013; Greenlee et al., 2013; Houde
et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 2013; Pickering and Garrod, 2013). As
Chen et al. (2013) puts it:
It has been suggested that the error signal that results from
a mismatch between the forward model prediction and the
actual sensory feedback enables the audio-vocal system to dis-
tinguish self-produced speech from externally-generated sounds,
to correct for vocal errors during ongoing speech production,
and to optimize the internal model for future productions
(p. 2).
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW ON SPEECH PRODUCTION
Despite its widespread dominance, critiques of the translational
model can be found from many different perspectives (e.g.,
Harris, 1981; Kelso and Tuller, 1985; Sperber and Wilson, 1986;
Elman, 1995; Goldstein, 2004). There are empirical findings that
are difficult to reconcile with a translational framework. For
example, spectrograms have revealed how there are no invariant
realizations of the supposed high-level segments believed to go
into speech planning (see Casserly and Pisoni, 2010, for a his-
torical overview). Due to this invariance at the physical level,
the translation account has been accused of imposing a mind-
body dualism (see e.g., Hammarberg, 1976; Fowler, 1980). It has
also been shown that speech errors often involve activation of
muscles aiming towards both the (supposedly) intended and the
unintended speech sounds (e.g., Mowrey and MacKay, 1990).
Both these findings have been taken to indicate that speech
errors should not be seen as the displacement of high-level,
abstract segments, and that planning and articulation are not as
separate and hierarchically ordered as is assumed in translation
theories.
The view of the individual speaker which we find in the
translation model constitutes the speaker part of the so called
“speech chain” (see Denes and Pinson, 1963). The speaker has a
message, which she translates into sound waves that hit the ear
of the listener, who then reconstructs the message, formulates a
response, translates it into sound waves, etc. This also corresponds
closely to the standard folk-psychological notion of language use.
Reddy (1979) points out that the way we speak about language in
everyday situations reveals that the concept of “thought transfer”
is deeply embedded in our folk-psychological view of language. A
number of interrelated claims in this approach are that the speaker
is (i) considered in relative isolation; (ii) that the meaning of the
utterance is to be found solely in the intentions of the speaker;
(iii) that cognition comes before communication; and (iv) that
contextual factors are seen as largely external to language (see
Linell, 2009).
An alternative way of approaching language is from an explic-
itly “dialogical” stance. Here, spoken language is seen as inherently
interactional and context-bound, and meaning as actively co-
created with other speakers (e.g., Linell, 1998). For example,
Vološinov (1986) has argued that the meanings of our utterances
are inseparable from the contexts in which they are uttered.
Cognition and communication are not seen as separate, tempo-
rally successive stages of interaction, but rather as two aspects of
the same thing (Linell, 2009). Accordingly, meaning in spoken
language is seen as embedded in the environment, in the conver-
sational context, in the interaction with other speakers etc. For
the individual speaker, this means that the meaning of her words
is not fully determined prior to taking linguistic form in actual
speech acts. Linell (1979) states that:
In most cases of normal spontaneous conversation we start speak-
ing without actually knowing precisely what we are going to say.
[...] This suggests a theory according to which the communicative
intentions are partly imprecise, vague and preconscious from
the start, and in which they become gradually more structured,
enriched, precise and conscious through the verbalization process
itself (p. 10).
Just as Wegner and Sparrow (2004) argue that authorship
knowledge is not something “given” on the inferential account,
the dialogical model argues that the full meaning of the utterance
is not given to the speaker prior to the actual utterance. Instead, it
places more importance on speech feedback to allow the speaker
to draw inferences about what, precisely, she is communicating.
Most likely, this includes cues and feedback from the social
situation: from the context of speech, from the environment and
from her interlocutors’ responses.
COGNITIVE MODELING COMPATIBLE WITH THE ALTERNATIVE VIEW
There have been some suggestions about how the cognitive pro-
cesses that generate meaningful utterances can be modeled, which
we believe are capable of accommodating the view of the speaker
as flexible and sensitive to contextual factors in the speech situ-
ation. For example, Dennett (1987, 1991) criticizes the tendency
to posit central executives in psychological models. In discussing
Levelt’s model, he questions the reliance in speech production
research on an all-knowing and powerful homunculus-like con-
ceptualizer to deliver completed meanings to the production
system:
The problem with [the serial model] is that the Conceptualizer
seems ominously powerful, a homunculus with too much knowl-
edge and responsibility. This excess of power is manifested in
the awkward problem of how to couch its output, the preverbal
message. If it already specifies a speech act [...] most of the hard
work of composition has happened before our model kicks in
(Dennett, 1991, p. 238).
To provide an account of speech production that actually
targets the problem of conceptualization, Dennett (1991) instead
proposes a distributed, or pandemonium, model. Rather than
postulating a conceptualizer, his model involves a competition for
control over the production processes between different special-
ized circuits. The content of speech is assumed to be determined
in an opportunistic fashion as power is shifted around in a “quasi-
evolutionary process”, at each point producing several different
variations on how an utterance could be formed. Rather than
postulating fully specified intentions, Dennett uses the concept
of a “mind-set” which functions as a constraining mechanism on
these processes. Proposals are, usually non-consciously, but some-
times consciously, weighed against each other in a “collaboration
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[...] of various subsystems none of which is capable on its own
of performing—or ordering—a speech act” (ibid., p. 239). This
allows the speaker to eventually zero in on a specific proposal
for how the utterance should be performed. These competitive
processes take place on a scale of milliseconds, meaning that the
content of the speech act is not fully specified until it is actually
spoken, and that we often learn the specific content of our speech
act as we speak.
A similar type of model is Baars’ (1980) competing plans
hypothesis, which assumes that multiple plans are often developed
during speech production. He holds that it represents a necessary
feature of any control system, and he claims that it can ultimately
account for the enormous flexibility of the speech production
system. In outline, he proposes that executive systems focus their
limited capacity on approximate orders that are “not fully elabo-
rated” (rather, they are somewhere within a “ball-park”, see p. 46)
and multiple, competing, plans may be developed, amounting to
much the same thing, but with slight variations, e.g., in shades
of meaning. The full, detailed, elaboration and realization of
these approximate, vague, and possibly ambiguous plans are then
carried out by specialized, “intelligent, semi-autonomous subsys-
tems” that are themselves beyond direct executive control (p. 49).
REAL-TIME SPEECH EXCHANGE
While we believe the alternative accounts developed by the likes
of Dennett, Linell and Baars serves as important counterpoints
to the dominant translation/comparator model of speech, the
field of psycholinguistics still suffers greatly from a lack of direct
empirical investigation of the conceptualization process. Thus, in
an attempt to approach the issues of speech production and self-
monitoring from a semantic perspective, we have developed a new
research methodology we call Real-time Speech Exchange (RSE;
Breidegard et al., in preparation; Lind et al., in press) for technical
details), which allows us to create situations where participants
say one thing, but they receive real-time auditory feedback of their
own voice suggesting that they are saying something else.
According to the dominant comparator perspective on speech,
the marked discrepancy in meaning between what participants
actually say and what they hear themselves saying should be
detected as originating from an external source. As Weiss et al.
(2013) states it: “...the higher the discrepancy, the more an action
is experienced as caused not by oneself, but by another cause, such
as another agent” (p. 2). Similarly, as stated by Sugimori et al.
(2013):
According to the forward model. . . speech is regarded as ema-
nating from the self only when the actual feedback matches the
prediction. That is, the efferent copy issued from the intense
speech command and appropriate feedback are needed to obtain a
sense of agency over speech (p. 361).
In contrast to previous perturbation studies in the speech
literature, the manipulations in our recent study (Lind et al., in
press) create both distinct semantic mismatches and carry direct
contextual consequences, such that if the participants believe
themselves to have uttered the inserted word, they will also believe
themselves to have made a mistake during the experimental test.
On the other hand, according to the inferential model, auditory
feedback is actively used for self-comprehension. Thus, on this
account it would be expected that the participants accept the
inserted statements to be self-produced, and believe they have
committed an error on the given trial.
In Lind et al. (in press), participants performed a computer-
ized Stroop test (Stroop, 1935). In the Stroop test you are shown
color words printed in a specific color (such as BLUE), and the
task is to always name the printed color, while ignoring the spelled
word. In the experiment we were seated in a hidden control
room, covertly controlling the PC-based voice exchange pro-
gram using a computer-game gamepad. For each manipulation,
we first recorded specific color words that participants uttered.
The program automatically cropped these recordings along the
time axis, so that word onset perfectly matched the onset of
the recording (each cropping was also checked and if necessary
corrected manually by the experimenter using a spectrogram-
presentation). Later in the test, we enabled a trigger mechanism
which automatically inserted the appropriate pre-recorded color-
word into the participant’s feedback, and simultaneously, the
program blocked the feedback of what the participant was actually
saying. To achieve this, participants wore headsets constructed
from highly sound isolating ear muffs fitted out with a micro-
phone and loudspeaker transducers, and we set the sound levels
at 8–10 dB above normal speaking level (as measured from the ear
of the speaker), effectively masking any air-conducted sound of
the speaker’s voice which may leak through the headphones. For
example, during a manipulated trial, the participants might have
seen the word “gray” in green color. They correctly said “green”
(“grön” in Swedish), but heard themselves say the phonologically
similar, but semantically distinct, word “gray” (“grå” in Swedish)
(see Figure 1). As the latency in the voice exchange software was as
low as 8 ms, this allowed us to create voice exchanges with usually
very high timing accuracy. The participants were also instructed
to use the same tone of voice during the whole experiment, which
increased the probability that the spoken and the inserted words
were similar in pronunciation. Inserted words were recorded in
as close proximity to the manipulations as possible. This means
that whatever differences there would be between a participant’s
pronunciations at different stages of the test, these differences
would be present both in the spoken and the inserted word.
Seventy-eight Swedish-speaking participants performed the
250 trial randomized Stroop test, which took approximately
10 min to complete. There were four manipulations during the
test, 2 from “gray” to “green” and 2 from “green” to “gray”. In
order to investigate participants’ experience of each manipulation,
we stopped the test directly after a manipulated trial and the
question “What did you say?” was presented on the screen. When
the participants had answered, the test resumed. Spread out in
between manipulated trials there were also four stops where the
test stopped and the question was presented, but without there
having been a manipulation beforehand. This allowed us to make
sure that participants had no trouble answering the questions in
general.
There were two methodological reasons why we found the
Stroop task particularly fitting for this initial experiment. First,
RSE requires that we know in advance what the participants
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FIGURE 1 | Example of a recording and manipulation (in this case
from “green” to “gray”) during the Stroop test. (A) At a
non-manipulated trial, a word (e.g. “gray”) is recorded. The participant
receives auditory feedback of the word he is uttering. (B) Later in the
test, the participant’s feedback is manipulated by inserting the
recording of “gray” as the participant utters the word “green”. (C) The
participant is asked “what did you say?” directly following the
manipulation.
are about to say, otherwise it would be impossible to precision
fit a replacement utterance. Our Stroop variant was run at an
unhurried pace, and there was a baseline of only around 2%
errors in the test. Thus, the responses of the participants at each
trial are easy to predict for the experimenter who has to perform
the recording and playback procedure. The second main reason
we chose to utilize the Stroop task was that it represents a tech-
nically manageable scenario where two alternative answers (the
print color or the color word) are at least possible as candidate
utterances. While the effect of a manipulation was to present a
highly unlikely error to the participants, it was still contextually
possible that they might have said the inserted word.
We performed structured post-test interviews to determine if
the participants had detected the manipulations, how many they
had detected, and how the manipulations were experienced. As a
general rule, we took the participants’ reports at face value when
determining number of trials detected, i.e., if a participant says he
or she detected three manipulated trials we assume that this is a
correct estimate. We then used various cues to determine which of
the manipulated trials were detected, such as seriously mistimed
trials detected by the participant, or identifiable comments about
their own behavior (e.g., “the first time I detected a manipulation
I answered the word I heard in my earphones, but the following
two times I gave the correct answer instead”). We classified
the detections into three levels of certainty ranging from total
certainty and a full understanding of the manipulation procedure,
to an uncertainty as to if anything out of the ordinary had even
occurred. If participants detected an exchange, they were alerted
to the occurrence of external manipulation and the purpose of
the experiment. The test then changed to an explicit mismatch
detection task, and given the low baseline error rate of the Stroop
test, it was easy to self-monitor based on the objective criteria of
correctness in the task. To avoid any such confounds, we removed
all trials following a first detection (resulting in the removal of
129 trials; see Lind et al., in press, for more details regarding
the procedure). While we managed to make a majority of voice
exchanges with high timing accuracy, some manipulations had
sub-optimal timing in that the inserted feedback either preceded
or followed what the participants actually were saying. We used
this to investigate the impact of timing accuracy by comparing
manipulations within a timing window of 5–20 ms (including
the 8 ms delay) with all other manipulations (delayed auditory
feedback starts affecting speech at around 30 ms, see e.g., Lee,
1950; Takaso et al., 2010).
The results showed that under ideal timing conditions, we
found a level of detection as low as 32%, with no more than
4% being certain of their detections (there were no differences
between the two types of exchanges, that is from “green” to
“gray” or from “gray” to “green”). Thus, when near simultaneous
timing-conditions are met, very few participants had more than
a vague hunch that what they heard themselves say was not
what they actually said. The importance of the timing window
we established was confirmed by the data. When the timing was
off, 55.5% of the manipulations were detected, significantly more
than when the timing was good. Furthermore, the proportion
of certain detections was considerably higher when the timing
was off (24%, compared to 4% when the timing was good),
which further emphasizes the importance of timing. Describing
the overall result in participant percentages, and combining timed
and mistimed trials, 61.5% of the participants failed to detect at
least one of the manipulated trials.
So, when the conditions we set up for our experiment were
fulfilled, many of the word exchanges were not detected. But
how did the participants react to the question “what did you
say?” When the question was posed after a non-manipulated trial,
participants answered the question according to what they had
said 99.4% of the time, so the baseline was to make virtually
no mistakes here. Responses to the non-detected manipulated
feedback, however, indicated that participants often accepted the
inserted feedback as if it had been self-produced. In 38.5% of the
non-detected trials they simply answered what they had heard.
For example, if they had said “green” and heard themselves say
“gray”, they answered “gray” when asked what they had said.
As it was easy to self-monitor based on the objective criteria
of correctness in the task (i.e., participants could remember the
correct answer from the visual representation on the screen),
a number of participants also accepted the inserted words as
self-produced, but “corrected” themselves in various ways. In
16.5% of the non-detected trials they did so either spontaneously
before the question even appeared on the screen (for example
they said “green”, heard “gray”, and immediately they said “no,
green”), or by correcting themselves when answering the question
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(for example, they said “green”, heard “gray”, and then when
the question popped up they answered it “I mean “green””). In
another 29.7% of the non-detected trials participants answered
the question according to what they actually said, but during the
post-test interview revealed that they believed themselves to have
made a mistake on those trials. That is, they accepted the inserted
word as self-produced, but they answered the question according
to what they thought was the correct answer in the test. Summing
up these categories we found that in a full 85% the non-detected
manipulated trials, the participants actually believed they had said
the word that we had played back to them. In the remaining
15% of non-detected manipulated trials, participants answered
the question according to what they had actually said, but we
were unable to determine how participants actually experienced
the feedback manipulations.
In our previous research on the phenomenon of choice blind-
ness (CB) we have contributed evidence to the effect that know-
ing one’s own attitudes is an inferential process, and that we
cannot simply introspect why we choose and act the way we
do. CB is a choice paradigm originally inspired by techniques
from the domain of close-up card-magic, which permits us to
surreptitiously manipulate the relationship between choice and
outcome that our participants experience, which has allowed us
to demonstrate that participants often fail to notice mismatches
between what they choose and what they actually get (hence,
being blind to the outcome of their choice) (e.g., Johansson et al.,
2005, 2006, 2013; Hall et al., 2012, 2013). The results of Lind et al.
(in press) indicate that speech intentions similarly have a strong
inferential component.
On the other hand, currently dominant theories of speech
production and self-monitoring would regard these results as
surprising and counterintuitive. We know from previous studies
using feedback manipulation techniques that speakers will some-
times compensate for perturbations of e.g., voice fundamental
frequency (F0) or formant frequencies in their auditory feedback
by shifting their production in the opposite direction (see Sec-
tion Different Feedback Channels Monitor Different Aspects of
Speech below for more on this), indicating that they accept the
feedback as being self-produced. But it has also been found that
when manipulations exceed a certain magnitude, compensation
decreases (MacDonald et al., 2010), as does neural responsiveness
to the perturbations (Behroozmand et al., 2009). This suggests
that speakers now process the perturbations as coming from an
external source instead, similar to how visual/manual illusions
such as the “rubber hand” illusion collapses when the magnitudes
of specific aspects of the manipulations become too large (see
MacDonald et al., 2010, p. 1066, for a discussion). In line with
this, the manipulations in the current experiment have distinct
semantic and contextual consequences in that, if the speaker
believes herself to have uttered the inserted word, then she will
also believe herself to have made a mistake during the trial.
Thus, from a comparator perspective the semantic level mismatch
between intention and outcome generated by the manipulations
should signal a lack of agency, and guarantee that the exchanged
words would be detected as coming from an external source (e.g.,
see Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998, for a similar discussion in the
manual domain).
FEEDBACK DURING SPEECH
As discussed above, we believe the result of Lind et al. (in press)
fits nicely with theorists who emphasize the social nature of
language and a more actively interpretative use of feedback, and
hold that the meaning of one’s own utterances are not necessarily
fully clear before they have been said.
But how do our results relate to previous studies on feedback
processing in speech? In this section we will look at research
showing that feedback is crucial for controlling several aspects and
levels of our speech. We will argue that different channels of feed-
back are used for monitoring different aspects of our own speech.
In the next section we will then propose that a main function
of auditory feedback is that it is used in a form of online “self-
comprehension” which allows speakers to internalize the context-
bound consequences (i.e., meanings) of their utterances.
DIFFERENT FEEDBACK CHANNELS MONITOR DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF
SPEECH
Researchers have long tried to specify what types of feedback help
the speaker in controlling her speech output. Ladefoged (1967)
suggested that different channels of feedback are responsible for
monitoring different aspects of speech:
The speaker has three kinds of feedback about the sounds he
is producing: auditory feedback by means of both bone and air
conduction; tactile feedback about the contacts between the lips,
tongue, velum and other parts of the vocal tract; and kinesthetic
feedback about the stretch of the muscles and the movements of
the joints. Many aspects of speech may be controlled as a result
of information available through more than one of these feedback
channels. But it seems that certain aspects are monitored typically
via one channel rather than another (pp. 162–163).
Empirical work on the uses of proprioceptive and auditory
feedback suggests this picture is largely correct. There is evidence
to suggest that somatosensory information provides a robust and
independent frame of reference for articulation. For example,
we know from post-lingually deafened individuals that even if
some aspects deteriorate, speech can remain intelligible for a long
time after loss of hearing (e.g., Cowie et al., 1982; Waldstein,
1990; Lane and Webster, 1991). Furthermore, studies have shown
how speakers compensate for jaw position perturbations even
when these have no acoustic consequences, indicating that the
somatosensory feedback can aid control of speech movements
without the help of auditory feedback (Tremblay et al., 2003; Nasir
and Ostry, 2006; but see also Feng et al., 2011).
But this does not mean that auditory feedback is not used
extensively when it is available. A classic example of the impor-
tance of the auditory loop is the “Lombard effect” (Lane and
Tranel, 1971; Patel and Schell, 2008), which deals with the largely
automatic (Pick et al., 1989) adjustments speakers make as a
response to noise in the environment, and which results in
more intelligible speech under such circumstances. More recently,
inventively designed experimental studies using real-time per-
turbations of auditory feedback have shown how a variety of
aspects of speech production are sensitively tuned to the feedback
that speakers receive of their own voice. For example, Houde
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and Jordan (1998, 2002) showed how speakers compensate for
formant shifts (F1 and F2) that were gradually induced in the
auditory feedback of their whispered speech. Villacorta et al.
(2007) showed similar results for F1 during voiced speech (see
also Purcell and Munhall, 2006a,b). Compensation has also been
shown for suddenly (Burnett et al., 1997, 1998; Purcell and
Munhall, 2006a) and gradually (Jones and Munhall, 2000, 2005)
induced changes in F0, and for suddenly induced perturbations
in F2 in a multisyllabic utterance (Cai et al., 2011). These types of
compensation appear to be automatic and reflexive (see Munhall
et al., 2009; Isius et al., 2013), and very difficult to suppress even
when participants are instructed to do so (Keough et al., 2013).
While it is mainly vowels that have been the focus of perturba-
tion studies, there are indications that stop consonants and [s]
fricatives are also monitored using auditory feedback (Waldstein,
1990; Shiller et al., 2009 respectively; though see Casserly, 2011).
Ladefoged (1967) further speculated that when one type of
feedback is absent for some reason, other channels of feedback
may take over those specific functions. There are indications
that multiple monitoring channels can take part in monitoring
specific aspects of speech and that if one channel is absent
then other channels may become more dominant. For example,
there is evidence to suggest that control over F0 is maintained
using both proprioceptive and auditory feedback (Larson et al.,
2008). Importantly, Larson et al. (2008) showed how pitch-shifted
feedback elicited greater compensatory reactions when feedback
from the vocal folds was removed with anesthesia. This suggests
that when incongruent proprioceptive feedback was not there
to counter the manipulation of the auditory feedback, the effect
was greater since the speakers had to rely solely on the auditory
feedback.
Relating this to the result of Lind et al. (in press), during
the manipulated trials the proprioceptive (and bone-conducted)
feedback of participant’s utterances was inconsistent with the
auditory feedback. The fact that participants nevertheless often
believed themselves to have uttered the word that was inserted
into their feedback indicates that when it comes to the meaning
of utterances, auditory feedback can override proprioceptive feed-
back (Feng et al., 2011, similarly found evidence that auditory
feedback plays a primary role during speech monitoring, rela-
tive to proprioceptive feedback). To our knowledge, no previous
studies investigated the role of feedback on the actual meaning of
spoken communication. We believe our result adds an important
aspect to the view of differential speech monitoring, namely that
auditory feedback could be seen as the primary channel for high-
level semantic monitoring.
This interpretation can be contrasted with a central feature
of the influential Levelt comparator model. One aspect of this
model that has been adopted by many other researchers is the
postulation of an internal monitoring channel (e.g., Levelt, 1983,
1989; Levelt et al., 1999; Özdemir et al., 2007). According to Levelt,
this internal channel uses the comprehension system in much the
same way as the external channel does, but it instead monitors
an “articulatory buffer” which holds phonological (e.g., Levelt,
1989), or later phonetic (Levelt and Wheeldon, 1994; Wheeldon
and Levelt, 1995) plans. This buffering mechanism was postulated
because the encoding of an utterance is believed to be completed
quicker than it can be articulated. However, we believe the reliance
on auditory feedback shown in our experiment suggests that
either this postulated internal channel is unavailable during overt
speech (as has been suggested by Vigliocco and Hartsuiker, 2002;
Huettig and Hartsuiker, 2010; Nozari et al., 2011), or that the
external channel has so much primacy that it can override the
internal one.
SPEAKING-INDUCED SUPPRESSION
In neurocognitive investigations of feedback, it has been shown
how responses in the auditory cortex are reduced during overt
speech when speakers receive unaltered feedback of their own
voice, compared to when they receive pitch-shifted feedback
or when they listen to recordings of the same utterances (e.g.,
Curio et al., 2000; Houde et al., 2002; Heinks-Maldonado et al.,
2005, 2006). This effect of speaking-induced suppression (SIS)
has been taken as evidence that the auditory cortex anticipates
the effects of utterances, suggesting a forward model mechanism
for speech production. As we discussed in the introduction,
this is supposed to give speakers a sense of agency for their
speech, and separate self-produced sounds from sounds coming
in externally.
The presence of SIS provides clear evidence that the speech
system has some privileged knowledge about what is about to
be uttered in comparison to listeners. However, it has not been
shown that this knowledge is fully represented and specified at
the semantic level. Our findings with RSE (Lind et al., in press)
suggests caution is warranted in going from SIS and forward
models of motor loops to a similar architecture at the level that
concerns what we intend and decide to say (e.g., Hickok, 2012,
2014; Pickering and Garrod, 2013). We suggested previously that
utterances are given full meaning first when they are actually
uttered and interpreted within their context of use. While the
details of articulatory motor programs may be specific enough to
elicit alarms when there is a mismatch with actual performance,
processing the meaning of an utterance might require a context
which is to a considerable degree external to the speaker’s nervous
system (see also e.g., Howes et al., 2013, who express similar
skepticism regarding the specificity of forward modeling during
speech).
In this context it is interesting to mention the findings of
Ventura et al. (2009). They investigated the impact of utterance
complexity and speed of speech upon SIS, using three different
speech conditions: /a/, /a-a-a/, and /a—a-a—a/. They found that
the more complex and rapidly spoken the utterance was, the less
pronounced the SIS was (that is, the difference between speaking
and listening to a recording of the same speech was greater the
simpler the utterance was). This indicates that as speakers move
from single-vowel utterances, which are what mostly has been
used in the SIS literature, to more complex vowel sequences, then
SIS is reduced. Ventura et al. (2009) interpret this as follows:
“The greatest SIS was observed [...] with the simple utterance
presumably because the internal representation, or mental model,
for that utterance was largely static and therefore easy to produce
and match” (p. 5). From this, it seems to follow that that the
more rapid and complex the utterance is, the less specified the
efference copy is, and the more speakers might have to rely on
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inferential processes of self-comprehension. We believe that the
inclusion of the complex contextual semantic aspects of even the
most basic utterances (as when naming colors in a Stroop task)
should further add to the need for feedback to determine what
one has said. In normal speech, utterances are a great deal more
rapid and complex than the rhythmic vowel-sequences used by
Ventura et al. (2009).
SELF-COMPREHENSION
In Lind et al. (in press) we showed how speakers often failed to
detect when we exchanged the auditory feedback of their own
speech to phonologically similar, but semantically distinct, words.
Furthermore, participants often accepted these inserted words as
if it had been they themselves who had uttered them. In this paper
we have discussed models of speech production and empirical
work on the use of feedback during speech, with an eye towards
making our surprising results understandable.
The main hypothesis presented in this paper is that auditory
feedback of our own speech is not just used to make sure we
say precisely what we intended to say. Rather, we propose that
our utterances often are semantically underspecified, and that
we actively use feedback to help specify for ourselves the full
meaning of what we are saying. In effect, we propose that auditory
feedback provides us with a channel for high-level, semantic “self-
comprehension”. As Linell (1998) puts it: “Speakers talk not only
in order to be understood by their interlocutors, but also in order
to understand what they themselves say and think. The speaker is
also a recipient of his own utterance” (p. 94).
However, in all feedback manipulation studies, it is necessary
to assure a high degree of control over the experimental situation.
This usually includes instructing the participants what to say and
when to say it (e.g., by displaying target words on a computer
screen). It is extremely difficult to create experimental situations
that allow researchers to manipulate specific aspects of speakers’
feedback in spontaneous speech (but see below for suggestions
on future RSE studies). Therefore, we do not know to what
extent the results of Lind et al. (in press) transfer to everyday
language use (see e.g., Borden, 1979, for a discussion about how
feedback manipulation experiments might, or might not, reveal
functions of feedback outside the laboratory). We chose to use the
Stroop task for the initial study partly because of the predictability
it provides, but also because a Stroop trial has two potential
answers: either you correctly name the color, or you mistakenly
name the spelled word. This is necessary since if there had been
only one possible answer (if, for example, participants were to
read color-words written in black and we had exchanged e.g.,
“green” to “gray” in their auditory feedback), then the inserted
word would have made absolutely no sense contextually, and the
self-comprehension model would predict that the participants
would infer that the utterances were not self-produced. Yet, while
the inserted words constitute potential answers in the Stroop
test, participants easily avoided errors in the test (as mentioned,
the error rate was below 2%). This means that the “errors” we
induced on manipulated trials constituted very unusual responses
for the participants. But the inserted feedback was accepted as
self-produced in spite of their records of correct answers. If
participants can accept inserted feedback as self-produced even
when this indicates that they have made a much more improbable
response, this suggests that we also can expect manipulations to
be accepted as self-produced in natural speech, where there is
a much broader range of possibly appropriate answers. To see
this, compare the favorable conditions for self-monitoring in a
situation where we are explicitly instructed what to do, and can
easily remember the correct response from the screen, with the
contextual ambiguity and uncertainty of expressing our opinions
on the conflict in Syria during a fluid dinner conversation (e.g.,
see Hall et al., 2012, 2013, for examples of how remarkably flexible
our expression of moral and political attitudes can be).
Importantly, the self-comprehension model does not deny that
error correction exists. The difference between our view and the
standard view lies in how the decision that a word was erroneously
uttered was made. According to the standard view, the decision
is made on internal criteria, that is, the speaker’s original inten-
tion provides the benchmark for correctness (see e.g., Postma,
2000). We instead suggest that self-comprehension, which relies
heavily on external criteria from the whole conversational context,
provides the necessary information for the speaker to judge if
her speech was a mistake or not. This high level comprehension
based correction is supplemented by lower-level articulatory error
correction, such as for prevoicing and timing alterations (e.g., Cai
et al., 2011).
“Self-comprehension” is implied in previous monitoring the-
ories (such as Levelt, 1989), where the comprehension system is
used as we listen to ourselves for monitoring purposes. Suppos-
edly, this listening is using the comprehension systems in much
the same way as when we listen to others speaking. Our hypothesis
is that we use auditory feedback of our own voice in order to
fully understand what it is we are saying, while in comparator
models like Levelt’s, the full meaning of the utterance is already
fixed as the articulation takes place, and self-comprehension is
seen as just a prerequisite for self-monitoring. However, this
does not mean that we believe that self-comprehension is every
bit like the comprehension of others. It would be ridiculous to
deny that people have the capacity to plan and mentally simulate
outcomes (linguistic or otherwise) before executing an action.
For example, Pickering and Garrod (2013) argue that speakers
routinely make predictions about what they will say during
speech, and that speakers base these predictions on an efference
copy of the speech command. In line with this, studies of SIS
and automatic compensation in feedback perturbation clearly
indicate that (some parts of) the effects of the utterances are
expected by (some parts of) the speech production system. But
efference copies are not prohibited by the self-comprehension
model, only the notion that they serve as the exclusive standard
for the final meaning of our utterances. Unfortunately, there has
been very little discussion in the speech perturbation literature
about levels of adaptation and consciousness (in contrast to the
manual domain, where this is often explicitly modeled, eg., see
Logan and Crump, 2010). Thus, one of the main points of the
current manuscript is to highlight the problematic transition
from evidence and models that deal with lower level auditory and
motoric feedback, to the “personal” level that includes meaning
and agency. The type of self-prediction we envisage would be part
of a wider self-comprehension skill which uses inferences from
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many different sources, among them auditory feedback. This
position is very similar to the inferential theories that have been
proposed in the broader agency literature (such as the bayesian
cue-integration account of Moore and Fletcher, 2012). When
Wegner and Wheatley (1999) discuss how we determine whether
we are the author of our own actions, they place great emphasis on
prior thought and expectations in the inferential matrix. Some of
the most dramatic examples of malleability of authorship comes
from experiments where it is suggested to participants that they
have had prior thoughts about outcomes that they actually did not
have (e.g., see Wegner and Sparrow, 2004; see also Johansson et al.,
2005, 2013; Hall et al., 2012, 2013, for evidence on inferential
processing regarding one’s own prior motives).
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In Lind et al. (in press) we used a new type of technique for
auditory feedback manipulation, RSE, where semantic aspects of
auditory feedback are manipulated in real time. We provided the
first empirical demonstration indicating that auditory feedback
helps specify, to ourselves, the meaning of what we say. It is our
hope that RSE will be adopted as a new tool for psycholinguistic
research to approach the difficult questions of conceptualization
and self-monitoring, and lead to new avenues in the study of how
feedforward and feedback mechanisms interact during speech.
To this end, we will make public the detailed specifications of
the hardware and software setup of our platform, and the RSE
software system will eventually be made freely available upon
request (Breidegard et al., in preparation). Below we provide a few
suggestions for future work.
One possible future improvement of RSE would be to explore
semantic exchanges using existing digital signal-processing tech-
niques which are used to manipulate e.g., formant frequencies
or fundamental frequency (e.g., Houde and Jordan, 1998; Jones
and Munhall, 2000), instead of the present “record- and insert”
technique that we used. Using a digital signal-processing tech-
nique one could possibly ensure that word duration, intensity,
voice quality and other acoustic parameters are more precisely
matched, thereby avoiding any detections of the manipulations
that stem from non-linguistic factors. However, the scope of a
continuous transformation in real time would be severely limited,
and it would be difficult to find meaningful and interesting
manipulations (particularly if social contextual factors are to be
considered, see below).
One limiting factor of RSE is that it requires that we know
in advance what the participants are about to say, otherwise it
would be impossible to precision fit a replacement utterance.
Thus, we needed a structured task like the Stroop test for the
Lind et al. (in press) study. In this context it would not have
been informative to ask the participants what they intended to say,
because the intentions are specified in the task instructions. Both
the traditional and the self-comprehension model would make
the same predictions about what the participants (would say they)
intended to say on any given trial. Unless the participants actively
try to foil the experiment, it makes no sense to intend to give the
incorrect response.
As discussed above it is not necessary to explicitly ask
about intentions to measure their (purported) role in verbal
self-monitoring, but in future studies it would nevertheless be
highly interesting to try to create a RSE experiment that allowed
for the necessary predictability, yet did not instruct the partici-
pants what to say (with a bottomless participant pool this could
be accomplished just by reasonable guessing and a much higher
failure rate than in Lind et al., in press). As the self-comprehension
hypothesis places great emphasis on the social nature of speech,
this introduces a whole new category of evidence that could both
support or work against different word exchanges. During such
a situation, social feedback from the experimenters and possible
confederates could be controlled with relation to the manipulated
feedback. For example, social feedback could be made to align
with the manipulated feedback to see if the inserted utterance
is more likely to be accepted as self-produced. Or discrepancies
can be created between auditory and social feedback to see if
the inserted utterance is less likely to be accepted, or if perhaps
auditory feedback in such cases can override social feedback. For
example, imagine if technical advances had allowed us to make
real-time exchanges of spontaneous speech at a dinner party. To
test the self-comprehension model we would then be required to
incorporate the social reactions and responses of the other guests
in the manipulation. Thus, if the host asked our participants if
they would fancy another slice of dessert, and we exchanged a
“yes” for a “no” (or vice versa), whether this insertion would be
accepted or not, might to a large degree depend on the social reac-
tion it gets. If the reaction is supportive of the manipulation (the
host and other guest loudly approves, saying of course one should
have a second helping of this exquisite dessert), then this ought to
indicate to the participants that the insertion was a plausible and
successful utterance, and that they meant it all along. If, on the
other hand, the reactions suggest that the response was somehow
inappropriate (if the other guests grumble about not having
received their first serving yet), then the participants ought to use
this information to distance themselves from the manipulation,
and explain they actually meant to decline another serving.
In the example above the hypothetical responses to be manip-
ulated (“yes” and “no”) are phonologically rather more dissimilar
than the words “grå” (gray) and “grön” (green), which we used
in Lind et al. (in press). If we independently could vary both
phonological and semantic similarity in RSE we could explore
their relative roles in influencing detection rate. Most likely, it
would not be possible to exchange the word “lejon” (lion) for
the word “noshörning” (rhinoceros). But it seems safe to assume
that “häst” (horse) could be exchanged for “hingst” (stallion), or
“fred” (peace) for “frid” (calm/peace), or, slightly more dissimilar
“plan” (flat) to “platt” (flat), “rak” (straight) to “rät” (straight)
or “kyss” (kiss) to “puss” (kiss). Conversely, what would hap-
pen with words that are phonologically similar, but semantically
extremely distinct, like “bil” (car) and “pil” (arrow) or “bok”
(book) and “bord” (table)? Again, the self-comprehension model
contends that whether these words would be detected primarily
depends on whether they are contextually appropriate or not.
For example, if a manipulation would be coupled with the type
of social feedback discussed in the hypothetical dinner exam-
ple above, we would predict that (congruent) social feedback
could counteract or override both semantic and phonological
dissimilarity.
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Importantly, the RSE method can also be used for studies
that do not aim at covertly manipulating speakers’ auditory feed-
back. For example, an often quoted argument for the existence
of an internal monitoring loop is the so-called “v-horizontal”-
argument (see e.g., Levelt, 1989). It concerns the fact that erro-
neous utterances sometimes have very short error-to-cutoff times
(<350 ms; Blackmer and Mitton, 1991; Hartsuiker and Kolk,
2001). These errors, it is argued, could not have been detected by
the external, auditory loop: given the time needed to comprehend
the utterance, realize it was an error and initiate the interruption,
the external loop is simply too slow. Instead, it has been postulated
that they are detected via an internal loop.
In a recent study (Lind et al., in press) we have approached
the issue of the internal monitoring loop by simulating the
interruption of “erroneous” utterances during a reading aloud
task. Participants are told that, as they perform the task, their
auditory feedback will on some random trials be manipulated so
that they will say one word, but hear themselves saying another
word. When this happens, they are instructed to stop speaking
as quickly as they possibly can. This way we separate auditory
feedback from all other forms of feedback the speaker receives,
including the proposed internal loop. Preliminary results show
how slightly more than half of all interruptions are made within
350 ms, and how some, albeit very few, interruptions are made
within 100 ms. Since interruptions are made only on manipulated
trials, it is unlikely that these interruptions were anticipatory
responses. These results present a challenge to the idea that an
internal loop must be postulated in order to account for error
detections with very brief error-to-cutoff times.
It is an open empirical question to what extent the self-
comprehension model extends to other modalities of language
production, but there is evidence to suggest that feedback can
play a role during writing which is similar to the one played by
auditory feedback during speech suggested by our results. For
example, Logan and Crump (2010) showed how writers will, in
real-time, as they are typing, take credit when the experimenters
covertly correct their errors, and also take the blame for errors
covertly inserted by the experimenters when in fact they had not
made an error. It therefore seems likely that an experiment similar
to Lind et al. (in press) could be implemented in a written task, in
for example a chat-conversation online.
REFERENCES
Baars, B. J. (1980). “The competing plans hypothesis: an heuristic viewpoint on the
causes of errors in speech,” in Temporal Variables in Speech: Studies in Honour of
Frieda Goldman-Eisler, eds H. Dechert and M. Raupach (The Hague: Mouton),
39–49.
Behroozmand, R., Karvelis, L., Liu, H., and Larson, C. R. (2009). Vocalization-
induced enhancement of the auditory cortex responsiveness during voice F0
feedback perturbation. Clin. Neurophysiol. 120, 1303–1312. doi: 10.1016/j.
clinph.2009.04.022
Behroozmand, R., Liu, H., and Larson, C. R. (2011). Time-dependent neural
processing of auditory feedback during voice pitch error detection. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 23, 1205–1217. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2010.21447
Blackmer, E. R., and Mitton, J. L. (1991). Theories of monitoring and the timing
of repairs in spontaneous speech. Cognition 39, 173–194. doi: 10.1016/0010-
0277(91)90052-6
Blakemore, S. J., Wolpert, D. M., and Frith, C. D. (2002). Abnormalities in
the awareness of action. Trends Cogn. Sci. 6, 237–242. doi: 10.1016/s1364-
6613(02)01907-1
Borden, G. J. (1979). An interpretation of research on feedback interruption in
speech. Brain Lang. 7, 307–319. doi: 10.1016/0093-934x(79)90025-7
Burnett, T. A., Freedland, M. B., Larson, C. R., and Hain, T. C. (1998). Voice F0
responses to manipulations in pitch feedback. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 103, 3153–
3161. doi: 10.1121/1.423073
Burnett, T. A., Senner, J. E., and Larson, C. R. (1997). Voice F0 responses to pitch-
shifted auditory feedback: a preliminary study. J. Voice 11, 202–211. doi: 10.
1016/s0892-1997(97)80079-3
Cai, S., Ghosh, S. S., Guenther, F. H., and Perkell, J. S. (2011). Focal manipulations
of formant trajectories reveal a role of auditory feedback in the online control of
both within-syllable and between-syllable speech timing. J. Neurosci. 31, 16483–
16490. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.3653-11.2011
Casserly, E. D. (2011). Speaker compensation for local perturbation of fricative
acoustic feedback. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 129, 2181–2190. doi: 10.1121/1.3552883
Casserly, E. D., and Pisoni, D. B. (2010). Speech perception and production. Wiley
Interdiscip. Rev. Cogn. Sci. 1, 629–647. doi: 10.1002/wcs.63
Chang, E. F., Niziolek, C. A., Knight, R. T., Nagarajan, S. S., and Houde, J. F. (2013).
Human cortical sensorimotor network underlying feedback control of vocal
pitch. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 110, 2653–2658. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1216827110
Chen, Z., Jones, J. A., Liu, P., Li, W., Huang, D., and Liu, H. (2013). Dynamics of
vocalization-induced modulation of auditory cortical activity at mid-utterance.
PLoS One 8:e60039. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0060039
Christoffels, I., Formisano, E., and Schiller, N. (2007). Neural correlates of verbal
feedback processing: an fMRI study employing overt speech. Hum. Brain Mapp.
28, 868–879. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20315
Cowie, R., Douglas-Cowie, E., and Kerr, A. G. (1982). A study of speech deterio-
ration in post-lingually deafened adults. J. Laryngol. Otol. 96, 101–112. doi: 10.
1017/s002221510009229x
Curio, G., Neuloh, G., Numminen, J., Jousmäki, V., and Hari, R. (2000).
Speaking modifies voice-evoked activity in the human auditory cortex. Hum.
Brain Mapp. 9, 183–191. doi: 10.1002/(sici)1097-0193(200004)9:4<183::aid-
hbm1>3.0.co;2-z
Daprati, E., Nico, D., Franck, N., and Sirigu, A. (2003). Being the agent: memory
for action events. Conscious. Cogn. 12, 670–683. doi: 10.1016/s1053-8100(03)
00074-6
David, N. (2012). New frontiers in the neuroscience of the sense of agency. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 6:161. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00161
Dell, G. (1986). A spreading-activation theory of retrieval in sentence production.
Psychol. Rev. 93, 283–321. doi: 10.1037//0033-295x.93.3.283
Dell, G., Juliano, C., and Govindjee, A. (1993). Structure and content in language
production: a theory of frame constraints in phonological speech errors. Cogn.
Sci. 17, 149–195. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog1702_1
Denes, P. B., and Pinson, E. N. (1963). The Speech Chain. Baltimore: Bell Telephone
Laboratories.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and
Company.
Elman, J. L. (1995). “Language as a dynamical system,” in Mind as Motion:
Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition, eds R. F. Port and T. van Gelder
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 195–225.
Feng, Y., Gracco, V. L., and Max, L. (2011). Integration of auditory and somatosen-
sory error signals in the neural control of speech movements. J. Neurophysiol.
106, 667–679. doi: 10.1152/jn.00638.2010
Fodor, J. A., Bever, T. G., and Garrett, M. F. (1974). The Psychology of Language – An
Introduction to Psycholinguistics and Generative Grammar. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Fourneret, P., and Jeannerod, M. (1998). Limited conscious monitoring of motor
performance in normal subjects. Neuropsychologia 36, 1133–1140. doi: 10.
1016/s0028-3932(98)00006-2
Fowler, C. A. (1980). Coarticulation and theories of extrinsic timing. J. Phon. 8,
113–133.
Fowler, C. A., Rubin, P., Remez, R. E., and Turvey, M. T. (1980). “Implications for
speech production of a general theory of action,” in Language Production Vol. 1:
Speech and Talk, ed B. Butterworth (London: Academic Press), 373–420.
Frith, C. D. (2014). Action, agency and responsibility. Neuropsychologia 55, 137–
142. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.09.007
Fromkin, V. A. (1971). The nonanomalous nature of anomalous utterances. Lan-
guage 47, 27–52. doi: 10.2307/412187
Fry, D. B. (1969). The linguistic evidence of speech errors. Brno Stud. Engl. 8, 69–74.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 166 | 10
Lind et al. The “self-comprehension” hypothesis
Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cogni-
tive science. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 14–21. doi: 10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5
Garrett, M. F. (1975). “The analysis of sentence production,” in The Psychology of
Learning andMotivation, ed G. H. Bower (New York: Academic Press), 133–177.
Garrett, M. F. (1976). “Syntactic processes in sentence production,” in New
Approaches to Language Mechanisms, eds R. Wales and E. C. T. Walker
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Press), 231–255.
Garrett, M. F. (1980). “Levels of processing in sentence production,” in Language
Production Vol. 1: Speech and Talk, ed B. L. Butterworth (London: Academic
Press), 177–220.
Goldstein, L. (2004). Philosophical integrations. Lang. Sci. 26, 545–563. doi: 10.
1016/j.langsci.2004.09.004
Greenlee, J. D. W., Behroozmand, R., Larson, C. R., Jackson, A. W., Chen, F.,
Hansen, D. R., et al. (2013). Sensory-motor interactions for vocal pitch mon-
itoring in non-primary human auditory cortex. PLoS One 8:e60783. doi: 10.
1371/journal.pone.0060783
Guenther, F. H., Ghosh, S. S., and Tourville, J. A. (2006). Neural modeling and
imaging of the cortical interactions underlying syllable production. Brain Lang.
96, 280–301. doi: 10.1016/j.bandl.2005.06.001
Haggard, P., and Clark, S. (2003). Intentional action: conscious experience
and neural prediction. Conscious. Cogn. 12, 695–707. doi: 10.1016/s1053-
8100(03)00052-7
Hall, L., Johansson, P., and Strandberg, T. (2012). Lifting the veil of morality:
choice blindness and attitude reversals on a self-transforming survey. PLoS One
7:e45457. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0045457
Hall, L., Strandberg, T., Pärnamets, P., Lind, A., Tärning, B., and Johansson, P.
(2013). How the polls can be both spot on and dead wrong: using choice
blindness to shift political attitudes and voter intentions. PLoS One 8:e60554.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0060554
Hammarberg, R. (1976). The metaphysics of coarticulation. J. Phon. 4, 353–363.
Harris, R. (1981). The Language Myth. London: Duckworth.
Hartsuiker, R. J., and Kolk, H. H. J. (2001). Error monitoring in speech production:
a computational test of the perceptual loop theory. Cogn. Psychol. 42, 113–157.
doi: 10.1006/cogp.2000.0744
Heinks-Maldonado, T. H., Mathalon, D. H., Gray, M., and Ford, J. M. (2005). Fine-
tuning of auditory cortex during speech production. Psychophysiology 42, 180–
190. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2005.00272.x
Heinks-Maldonado, T. H., Nagarajan, S. S., and Houde, J. F. (2006). Magnetoen-
cephalographic evidence for a precise forward model in speech production.
Neuroreport 17, 1375–1379. doi: 10.1097/01.wnr.0000233102.43526.e9
Hickok, G. (2012). Computational neuroanatomy of speech production. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 13, 135–145. doi: 10.1038/nrn3158
Hickok, G. (2014). The architecture of speech production and the role of the
phoneme in speech processing. Lang. Cogn. Neurosci. 29, 2–20. doi: 10.
1080/01690965.2013.834370
Houde, J. F., and Jordan, M. I. (1998). Sensorimotor adaptation in speech produc-
tion. Science 279, 1213–1216. doi: 10.1126/science.279.5354.1213
Houde, J. F., and Jordan, M. I. (2002). Sensorimotor adaptation of speech I:
compensation and adaptation. J. Speech Lang. Hear. Res. 45, 295–310. doi: 10.
1044/1092-4388(2002/023)
Houde, J., Kort, N., and Niziolek, C. (2013). Neural evidence for state feedback
control of speaking. Proc. Meet. Acoust. 19, 1–9. doi: 10.1121/1.4799495
Houde, J. F., Nagarajan, S. S., Sekihara, K., and Merzenich, M. M. (2002). Modula-
tion of the auditory cortex during speech: an MEG study. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14,
1125–1138. doi: 10.1162/089892902760807140
Howes, C., Healey, P. G. T., Eshghi, A., and Hough, J. (2013). “Well, that’s one
way”: interactivity in parsing and production. Behav. Brain Sci. 36:359. doi: 10.
1017/S0140525X12002592
Huettig, F., and Hartsuiker, R. J. (2010). Listening to yourself is like listening to
others: external, but not internal, verbal self-monitoring is based on speech
perception. Lang. Cogn. Process. 25, 347–374. doi: 10.1080/01690960903046926
Isius, A., Mitsuya, T., and Munhall, K. (2013). Does compensation in auditory
feedback require attention? Proc. Meet. Acoust. 19, 1–8. doi: 10.1121/1.4799040
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., and Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detect
mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science
310, 116–119. doi: 10.1126/science.1111709
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., Tärning, B., and Lind, A. (2006). How
something can be said about telling more than we can know. Conscious. Cogn.
15, 673–692. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.09.004
Johansson, P., Hall, L., Tärning, B., Sikström, S., and Chater, N. (2013). Choice
blindness and preference change: you will like this paper better if you (believe
you) chose to read it! J. Behav. Decis. Mak. doi: 10.1002/bdm.1807
Jones, J. A., and Munhall, K. G. (2000). Perceptual calibration of F0 production:
evidence from feedback perturbation. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 108, 1246–1251.
doi: 10.1121/1.1288414
Jones, J. A., and Munhall, K. G. (2005). Remapping auditory-motor representations
in voice production. Curr. Biol. 15, 1768–1772. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2005.08.063
Kelso, J. A. S., and Tuller, B. (1985). Intrinsic time in speech production: theory,
methodology and preliminary observations. Haskins Laboratories: Status Report
on Speech Research SR-81, 23–39.
Keough, D., Hawco, C., and Jones, J. A. (2013). Auditory-motor adaptation to
frequency-altered auditory feedback occurs when participants ignore feedback.
BMC Neurosci. 14:25. doi: 10.1186/1471-2202-14-25
Kühn, S., Brass, M., and Haggard, P. (2013). Feeling in control: neural correlates of
experience of agency. Cortex 49, 1935–1942. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2012.09.002
Ladefoged, P. (1967). Three Areas of Experimental Phonetics. London: Oxford
University Press.
Lane, H., and Tranel, B. (1971). The Lombard sign and the role of hearing in speech.
J. Speech Lang. Hear. Res. 14, 677–709.
Lane, H., and Webster, J. W. (1991). Speech deterioration in postlingually deafened
adults. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 89, 859–866. doi: 10.1121/1.1894647
Larson, C. R., Altman, K. W., Liu, H., and Hain, T. C. (2008). Interactions between
auditory and somatosensory feedback for voice F0 control. Exp. Brain Res. 187,
613–621. doi: 10.1007/s00221-008-1330-z
Lashley, K. S. (1951). “The problem of serial order in behavior,” in Cerebral
Mechanisms in Behaviour, ed L. A. Jeffress (NY: Wiley), 112–136.
Lee, B. S. (1950). Effects of delayed speech feedback. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 22, 824–826.
doi: 10.1121/1.1906696
Levelt, W. J. M. (1983). Monitoring and self-repair in speech. Cognition 14, 41–104.
doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(83)90026-4
Levelt, W. J. M. (1989). Speaking. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Levelt, W. J. M., Roelofs, A., and Meyer, A. S. (1999). A theory of lexical access
in speech production. Behav. Brain Sci. 22, 1–75. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X990
01776
Levelt, W. J. M., and Wheeldon, L. (1994). Do speakers have access to a mental
syllabary? Cognition 50, 239–269. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(94)90030-2
Lind, A., Hall, L., Johansson, P., Breidegard, B., and Balkenius, C. (in press). Real-
time speech-exchange indicates that we use auditory feedback to specify the
meaning of what we say. Psychol. Sci.
Linell, P. (1979). “On knowing what one is going to say,” in Kommunikativ
kompetens Och Fackspråk, eds M. Linnrud and J. Svartvik (Lund: Läromedels-
centralen), 1–17.
Linell, P. (1982). The concept of phonological form and the activities of speech
production and speech perception. J. Phon. 10, 37–72.
Linell, P. (1998). Approaching Dialogue. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking Language, Mind and World Dialogically. Charlotte, NC:
Information Age Publishing.
Logan, G. D., and Crump, M. J. C. (2010). Cognitive illusions of authorship reveal
hierarchical error detection in skilled typists. Science 330, 683–686. doi: 10.
1126/science.1190483
MacDonald, E. N., Goldberg, R., and Munhall, K. G. (2010). Compensations in
response to real-time formant perturbations of different magnitudes. J. Acoust.
Soc. Am. 127, 1059–1068. doi: 10.1121/1.3278606
Moore, J., and Fletcher, P. (2012). Sense of agency in health and disease: a review of
cue integration approaches. Conscious. Cogn. 21, 59–68. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.
2011.08.010
Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., and Haggard, P. (2009). Modulating the sense
of agency with external cues. Conscious. Cogn. 18, 1056–1064. doi: 10.1016/j.
concog.2009.05.004
Mowrey, R. A., and MacKay, I. R. A. (1990). Phonological primitives: electromyo-
graphic speech error evidence. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 88, 1299–1312. doi: 10.1121/1.
399706
Munhall, K. G., MacDonald, E. N., Byrne, S. K., and Johnsrude, I. (2009). Talkers
alter vowel production in response to real-time formant perturbation even when
instructed not to compensate. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 125, 384–390. doi: 10.1121/1.
3035829
Nasir, S. M., and Ostry, D. J. (2006). Somatosensory precision in speech produc-
tion. Curr. Biol. 16, 1918–1923. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2006.07.069
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 166 | 11
Lind et al. The “self-comprehension” hypothesis
Nelson, A., Schneider, D. M., Takatoh, J., Sakurai, K., Wang, F., and Mooney,
R. (2013). A circuit for motor cortical modulation of auditory cortical
activity. J. Neurosci. 33, 14342–14353. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2275-13.
2013
Nozari, N., Dell, G. S., and Schwartz, M. F. (2011). Is comprehension nec-
essary for error detection? A conflict-based account of monitoring in
speech production. Cogn. Psychol. 63, 1–33. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.
05.001
Özdemir, R., Roelofs, A., and Levelt, W. J. M. (2007). Perceptual uniqueness point
effects in monitoring internal speech. Cognition 105, 457–465. doi: 10.1016/j.
cognition.2006.10.006
Patel, R., and Schell, K. W. (2008). The influence of linguistic content on the
lombard effect. J. Speech Lang. Hear. Res. 51, 209–220. doi: 10.1044/1092-
4388(2008/016)
Pick, H. L., Siegel, G. M., Fox, P. W., Garber, S. R., and Kearney, J. K. (1989).
Inhibiting the Lombard effect. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 85, 894–900. doi: 10.1121/1.
397561
Pickering, M. J., and Garrod, S. (2013). An integrated theory of language
production and comprehension. Behav. Brain Sci. 36, 329–392. doi: 10.
1017/S0140525X12001495
Postma, A. (2000). Detection of errors during speech production: a review of speech
monitoring models. Cognition 77, 97–131. doi: 10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00
090-1
Purcell, D. W., and Munhall, K. G. (2006a). Compensation following real-time
manipulation of formants in isolated vowels. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 119, 2288–2297.
doi: 10.1121/1.2173514
Purcell, D. W., and Munhall, K. G. (2006b). Adaptive control of vowel formant
frequency: evidence from real-time formant manipulation. J. Acoust. Soc. Am.
120, 966–977. doi: 10.1121/1.2217714
Reddy, M. J. (1979). “The conduit metaphor: a case of frame conflict in our
language about language,” in Metaphor and Thought, ed A. Ortony (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 284–310.
Shattuck-Hufnagel, S. (1979). “Speech errors as evidence for a serial-ordering
mechanism in sentence production,” in Sentence Processing: Psycholinguistic
Studies Presented to Merrill Garrett, eds W. E. Cooper and E. C. T. Walker
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 295–342.
Shiller, D. M., Sato, D., Gracco, V. L., and Baum, S. R. (2009). Perceptual recalibra-
tion of speech sounds following speech motor learning. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 125,
1103–1113. doi: 10.1121/1.3058638
Sperber, D., and Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance. London: Blackwell Publishing.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. J. Exp. Psychol.
18, 643–662. doi: 10.1037/h0054651
Sugimori, E., Asai, T., and Tanno, Y. (2013). The potential link between sense
of agency and output monitoring over speech. Conscious. Cogn. 22, 360–374.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.07.010
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., and Newen, A. (2008). Beyond the comparator model: a
multifactorial two-step account of agency. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 219–239. doi: 10.
1016/j.concog.2007.03.010
Takaso, H., Eisner, F., Wise, R. J. S., and Scott, S. K. (2010). The effect of delayed
auditory feedback on activity in the temporal lobe while speaking: a positron
emission tomography study. J. Speech Lang. Hear. Res. 53, 226–236. doi: 10.
1044/1092-4388(2009/09-0009)
Tremblay, S., Shiller, D. M., and Ostry, D. J. (2003). Somatosensory basis of speech
production. Nature 423, 866–869. doi: 10.1038/nature01710
Ventura, M. I., Nagarajan, S. S., and Houde, J. F. (2009). Speech target modulates
speaking induced suppression in auditory cortex. BMC Neurosci. 10:58. doi: 10.
1186/1471-2202-10-58
Vigliocco, G., and Hartsuiker, R. J. (2002). The interplay of meaning, sound and
syntax in sentence production. Psychol. Bull. 128, 442–472. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.128.3.442
Villacorta, V. M., Perkell, J. S., and Guenther, F. H. (2007). Sensorimotor adaptation
to feedback perturbations of vowel acoustics and its relation to perception. J.
Acoust. Soc. Am. 122, 2306–2319. doi: 10.1121/1.2773966
Vološinov, V. N. (1986). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (L. Matejka and I.
R. Titunik, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Waldstein, R. S. (1990). Effects of postlingual deafness on speech production:
implications for the role of auditory feedback. J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 88, 2099–2114.
doi: 10.1121/1.400107
Wegner, D., and Sparrow, B. (2004). “Authorship processing,” in The Cognitive
Neurosciences: 3rd Edition, ed M. Gazzaniga (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
1201–1209.
Wegner, D., and Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation: sources of the
experience of will. Am. Psychol. 54, 480–492. doi: 10.1037//0003-066x.54.7.480
Weiss, C., Tsakiris, M., Haggard, P., and Schütz-Bosbach, S. (2013). Agency in the
sensorimotor system and its relation to explicit action awareness.Neuropsycholo-
gia 52, 82–92. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.09.034
Wheeldon, L. R., and Levelt, W. J. M. (1995). Monitoring the time course of
phonological encoding. J. Mem. Lang. 34, 311–334. doi: 10.1006/jmla.1995.1014
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 31 July 2013; accepted: 05 March 2014; published online: 28 March
2014.
Citation: Lind A, Hall L, Breidegard B, Balkenius C and Johansson P (2014) Auditory
feedback of one’s own voice is used for high-level semantic monitoring: the “self-
comprehension” hypothesis. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:166. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.
00166
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Lind, Hall, Breidegard, Balkenius and Johansson. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 166 | 12
